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Abstract
In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis, banks started reflecting into
derivative pricing the cost of capital and collateral funding through XVA metrics.
Here XVA is a catch-all acronym whereby X is replaced by a letter such as C
for credit, D for debt, F for funding, K for capital and so on, and VA stands for
valuation adjustment.
This behaviour is at odds with economies where markets for contingent claims
are complete, whereby trades clear at fair valuations and the costs for capital and
collateral are both irrelevant to investment decisions.
In this paper, we set forth a mathematical formalism for derivative portfolio
management in incomplete markets for banks. A particular emphasis is given to
the problem of finding optimal strategies for retained earnings which ensure a
sustainable dividend policy.
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31 Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators launched in a major banking reform
effort aimed at securing the financial system by raising collateralisation and capital
requirements and by pushing toward centrally cleared trading in order to mitigate
counterparty risk. The resulting Basel III Accord as been enshrined in law and is being
followed by a stream of other regulatory reforms such as the Fundamental Review of
the Trading Book (FRTB, see BCBS (2013)).
The quantification of market incompleteness based on XVA metrics is emerging as
the unintended consequence of the banking reform. Here XVA is a catch-all acronym
whereby X is replaced by a letter such as C for credit, D for debt, F for funding, K for
capital and so on, and VA stands for valuation adjustment. Interestingly enough, the
new regulatory framework has been designed on the premise that the financial system
can be secured by elevating capitalisation requirements for banks and forcing them
to collateralise trades as much as needed to virtually eliminate counterparty credit
risk, based on the assumption that costs of capital and funding for collateral are both
irrelevant to investment decisions and do not give rise to material systemic inefficiencies.
However, this conclusion is only valid under the complete market hypothesis. The
impact of market incompleteness is exacerbated by the new regulatory environment,
motivating investment banks to rewire trading strategies around the optimisation of
XVA metrics, which precisely quantify the impact of market incompleteness.
1.1 Market Incompletenesses
The hypothesis of market completeness in Arrow and Debreu (1954), followed by the
work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), represents a milestone for the
development of markets for contingent claims as it indicates that derivative pricing
can be based on replication arguments. This leads to remarkable simplifications: if
all trades are perfectly replicable, then each trade is valued at its price of replication,
independent of the endowment and of any other entity specific information. In complete
markets, economic agents transact symmetrically and there is no distinction between
price-maker and price-taker. There is also no distinction between fair valuation and
entry price of a derivative contract. The most glaring omission in a complete market
model for a bank is a justification for shareholders’ capital at risk as a loss absorbing
buffer. Derivative valuation adjustments such as cost of capital and cost of funding
would be rigorously zero under the assumption of complete markets, as follows from
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem.
Since the crisis, market participants came to the realisation that costs of incomplete-
ness are material and started to reflect these effects into entry prices. The primary
focus was on hedging strategies for counterparty risk which are typically imperfect.
Counterparty risk is the financial risk arising as a consequence of client or own default.
The risk of financial loss as a consequence of client default is hard to replicate since
single name CDS instruments are illiquid and are typically written on bonds, not on
swaps with rapidly varying value. Own default of the bank is even harder (not to say
impossible) to hedge since, to hedge it, a bank would need to be able to freely trade
its own debt. Even so, the shareholders of the bank could not effectively monetise the
4hedging benefit, which would be hampered by bankruptcy costs. In this situation, the
assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem do not hold and shareholders’ decisions
in general depend on the funding strategy of the bank.
In the case of counterparty credit risk, incompleteness is a complex phenomenon
as it has capital structure implications and is perceived differently by shareholders
and creditors. Counterparty credit risk is related to cash-flows or valuations linked
to either counterparty default or the default of the bank itself. Shareholders are pre-
vented by laws based on principles such as pari-passu from executing certain classes
of trades that would transfer wealth away from creditors. Moreover, wealth transfers
from shareholders to creditors cannot be offset in full by managers as banks are intrin-
sically leveraged and one cannot synthetically have shareholders become bond-holders
and transform a bank into a pure equity entity. Interestingly enough, the latter is a
trade on which the classical proof of the Modigliani-Miller theorem is based. Hence,
only weaker statements will hold in the case of banks.
The discounted expectation of losses due to counterparty or own default are respec-
tively known as CVA (credit valuation adjustment) and DVA (debt valuation adjust-
ment). Regulators privilege collateralisation as the form of counterparty risk mitigant.
However, the credit risk of the bank itself induces additional costs to fund margins
that are required to mitigate counterparty risk: variation margin tracking the mark-
to-market of the portfolios of the bank with its counterparties and initial margins of
the bank set as a cushion against gap risk, i.e. the possible slippage between the port-
folio and the variation margin of a defaulted party during the few days that separate
the default from the liquidation of the portfolio. The discounted expectations of the
cost of funding cash collateral which can be rehypothecated is known as funding val-
uation adjustment (FVA), while the cost of funding segregated collateral to be posted
as initial margin is the margin valuation adjustment (MVA).
The CVA, FVA and MVA flow into a reserve capital account (RC), which is held
against expected counterparty default and funding losses. As losses are realized, reserve
capital may deviate from its theoretical equilibrium level given by the expectation of
future losses, a value we call target reserve capital (TRC). Banks are required to hold
economic capital (EC) sufficient to absorb exceptional losses. Economic capital is
typically computed to be the expected shortfall with confidence level 97.5% of the one-
year-ahead loss. Since economic capital needs to be remunerated at the hurdle rate,
bank clients are asked to pay an additional capital valuation adjustment (KVA), which
then flows into the dividend stream. The KVA is not treated as reserve capital, but
rather as a retained earning which contributes to economic capital.
1.2 Contents of the Paper
Most of the mathematical finance incomplete markets literature can be viewed as
providing ways of selecting the “right” risk-neutral probability measure, under which
financial derivatives are fairly valued as conditional expectation of their future cash-
flows discounted at the risk-free rate. This includes utility indifference pricing, risk-
minimisation and minimal martingale measures, utility maximisation and minimisation
over martingale measures, good-deal pricing, market-consistent valuation, probability
5distortions, etc. (see e.g. Hodges and Neuberger (1989), Schweizer (2001), Rogers
(2001), Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000), Madan (2015)).
In this paper, we develop a mathematically rigorous, economically sustainable and
numerically tractable XVA methodology, in two steps. First, a risk-neutral XVA (the
target reserve capital TRC) is computed under a given a risk-neutral measure, possibly
selected by one of above-mentioned procedures or simply by a pragmatic calibration
approach delegating measure selection to market fit. Second, a risk-adjustment is
computed on top of the TRC in the form of the KVA.
Part I provides an intuitive balance-sheet presentation of the main concepts and
ideas of the paper.
Interestingly enough, Basel III/IFRS 9 do not contain a principled approach to
cost of capital. Adapting to banks the insurance principles of Solvency II and IFRS
4 Phase II, Part II introduces a precise and economically well grounded definition of
the KVA as the cost of remunerating shareholders capital at a sustainable hurdle rate
throughout the whole life of the portfolio (or until the default of the bank happens).
The companion task is a proper modeling of the derivative portfolio loss process
required as input in the economic capital and KVA computations. For this, a dynamic
modeling of reserve capital and target reserve capital are required. This is done in
Part III based on risk-neutral valuation principles, under the assumption that trading
strategies are self-financing from the viewpoint of shareholders of the bank (but may
have the side-effect of transferring wealth between clients and bank creditors). As
compared with insurance, one difficulty specific to banks is that, in the case of derivative
portfolios, capital is a form of funding which is intertwined and to a large extent
fungible with debt. While insurance portfolios have only a KVA-like metric called risk
margin (RM), banks have several other metrics such as FVA and MVA that are related
to funding the collateral involved in OTC derivative transactions. The intertwining
between the FVA and EC metrics leads to a forward-backward stochastic differential
equation (FBSDE) for the reserve capital and target reserve capital. By doing so, we
also improve the FVA models in Albanese, Andersen, and Iabichino (2015) or Cre´pey
and Song (2015) (see also Albanese and Andersen (2014) and Andersen, Duffie, and
Song (2016)).
Part IV implements this XVA methodology by means of nested Monte Carlo sim-
ulations that are used for solving the (RC,TRC) FBSDE iteratively. The ensuing loss
process L = TRC−RC is then plugged as input data of the KVA computations. The
paper is concluded by two case studies.
A list of acronyms is provided after the bibliography.
An announcement of the present work is in the short article by Albanese, Caenazzo,
and Cre´pey (2015).
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Balance-Sheet Analysis
Figure 1 represents a stylized balance sheet of an investment bank. The assets of a
bank consist of reserve capital (RC), gross shareholder capital (capital at risk SCR and
uninvested equity), risk margins (KVA), derivative receivables and hedges of deriva-
tive payables. Its liabilities are debt, derivative payables and hedges of derivative
receivables. Contra-assets and contra-liabilities are respective assets and liabilities
deductions, which will play a key role in this paper.
A defaultable entity is characterised by leverage and has at least two different
classes of stakeholders: shareholders and creditors. Shareholders have the control of
the firm and are solely responsible for investment decisions up until the time of default.
At default time, shareholders are wiped out. Creditors instead have no decision power
until the time of default, but are protected by laws such as pari-passu forbidding certain
trades that would trigger wealth transfers from them to shareholders. Hence, there are
two distinct but intertwined sources of market incompleteness:
• Counterparty risk and market risk cannot be perfectly replicated,
• Managers cannot offset wealth transfers from shareholders to bondholders and
shareholders cannot realistically acquire all bank debt.
In order to focus on counterparty risk and XVAs, we assume throughout the paper
that the market risk of the bank is perfectly hedged by means of back-to-back trades.
Under this assumption, derivative receivables and hedges of derivative payables are
always a perfect match to derivative payables and hedges of derivative receivables. In
addition, in case a new deal is traded, the gross shareholder capital of the bank and
its debt remain constant. Hence, in case a new deal is traded,
∆(Assets− Liabilities) = ∆RC + ∆KVA. (1)
2 Fair Valuation
A stylized balance sheet equation of a bank can be stated as (see Figure 1):
Assets− (UCVA + FVA + MVA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contra-assets
=
Liabilities− (FTDDVA + CVACL + FDA + MDA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contra-liabilities
+AE,
(2)
where:
• Assets and contra-assets, liabilities and contra-liabilities, FVA (funding varia-
tion adjustment) and MVA (margin variation adjustment) have been introduced
before;
7RC account
SCR
KVA account
yr1
Debt
Uninvested equity
ASSETS AND CONTRA-LIABILITIES
CONTRA-ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
yr39 yr40
CET1
Derivative receivables
and hedges of derivative payables
Derivative payables
and hedges of derivative receivables
Contra-liabilities
AE
TRC =UCVA+FVA+MVA
EC = max
(
ES97.5%
(
∆1yr(−CET1)
)
,KVA
)
Figure 1: Stylized balance sheet of an investment bank. Contra-liabilities at the left
top are shown in a dashed box because they should be ignored from the point of view
of the shareholders (they only contribute to AE, not to CET1). Financial payables
(assets) and receivables (liabilities) at the bottom are shown in dashed boxes at the
bottom because they constantly match each other under our back-to-back market hedge
assumption. The TRC (resp. EC) computation is the goal of a reserve capital pricing
(resp. economic risk) model. The size of the KVA account is deduced from EC by the
KVA formula and SRC is deduced from them as (EC−KVA). At each new deal, the
RC account is refilled by corresponding incremental TRC amounts. Between deals, the
RC account is gradually depleted by counterparty default risk and funding losses as
they occur. The difference in size between the left and the right column in the figure
corresponds to CET1. The dotted arrows represent RC losses in “normal years 1 to
39”, and in an “exceptional year 40” with full depletion of the RC, SRC and KVA
accounts (the numberings yr1 to yr40 are fictitious yearly scenarios in line with the
97.5% confidence level used for the expected shorfall that underlies economic capital).
Whenever reserves are depleted and below the theoretical level, banks raise equity
capital to realign them.
8• UCVA is the unilateral CVA pricing the cash-flows valued by the CVA over an
infinite time horizon;
• FTDDVA is the first-to-default DVA pricing the cash-flows valued by the DVA
until the first default time of the bank and each considered counterparty, and we
define similarly the FTDCVA, i.e. first-to-default CVA;
• CVACL is the difference (UCVA− FTDCVA);
• FDA (akin to the DVA2 in Hull and White (2012)) and MDA are further contra-
liabilities respectively equal to the FVA and the MVA (see Albanese and Andersen
(2014) and Albanese et al. (2015));
• AE is the accounting equity of the bank.
In virtue of the definition of CVACL and of the cancellations between the funding
terms, the equation (2) can be simplified as follows:
Assets− FTDCVA = Liabilities− FTDDVA + AE. (3)
In case a new deal is traded, taking the difference between the balance-sheet equa-
tion (3) at deal time and right before the deal yields, using (1):
∆AE = ∆RC + ∆KVA− (∆FTDCVA−∆FTDDVA).
If there is no risk or no capital at risk or if capital at risk is not remunerated, i.e. in
the absence of KVA, then the incremental reserve capital needed from clients in order
to keep accounting AE stable is
∆RC = ∆FTDCVA−∆FTDDVA. (4)
Note that this formula involves the first-to-default CVA and DVA, where the counter-
party default losses are only considered until the first occurrence of a default of the
bank or its counterparty in the deal. This is consistent with the fact that later cash
flows will, as first emphasised in Duffie and Huang (1996), Bielecki and Rutkowski
(2002) and Brigo and Capponi (2008), not be paid in principle. The formula is sym-
metrical in that it also corresponds to the negative of the analogous quantity considered
from the point of view of the counterparty of the bank. In this sense, the symmetrical
adjustment (4) to the mark-to-market of a deal corresponds to fair valuation.
3 Entry Price
However, such a fair value of the deal cannot correspond to its entry price unless one
is in a complete market where contra-liability cash-flows can be hedged and there-
fore monetized by the shareholders, and where counterparty (and market) risk can
be hedged as well so that no capital needs be put at risk by the shareholders and
remunerated to them at a hurdle rate.
9In fact, contra-liability cash-flows only benefit to the creditors of the bank, in the
form of an increased recovery rate. As a consequence, they should be ignored in entry
prices, which must be aligned to the interests of the shareholders.
Following up to these considerations, regulators have de-recognised the DVA as
a contributor to Core Equity Tier I capital (CET1), the metric meant to represent
the fair valuation of shareholder capital. Recently, the financial accounting standards
board (FASB) has redefined the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and
stated that the DVA should not contribute to reported earnings. Regulators went even
further and decided that the CVA should be computed unilaterally to ensure that it is
a monotonic function of the bank credit spread. As we shall will demonstrate in Sect. 9
(cf. (25) and (30)), this decision can be modelled by postulating that shareholders are
liable to pay UCVAτ to bank bondholders at the default time τ of the bank.
The corresponding contra-liabilities myopic, shareholders-centric balance sheet equa-
tion of the bank appears as (cf. the full-balance sheet equation (2) and Figure 1):
Assets− (UCVA + FVA + MVA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contra-assets
= Liabilities + CET1.
(5)
In case a new deal is traded, if there was no KVA, then, using (1), this would result in
∆CET1 = ∆RC− (∆UCVA + ∆FVA + ∆MVA).
Hence, the incremental amount of reserve capital that would keep stable the CET1 net
of the KVA account is
∆RC = ∆UCVA + ∆FVA + ∆MVA = ∆TRC, (6)
where the target reserve capital (TRC) is defined as the sum of the contra-assets, i.e.
TRC = UCVA + FVA + MVA. (7)
However, shareholders want their risk to be remunerated at a hurdle rate h, which
constitutes an additional cost passed to the clients, measured by a suitable KVA metric.
In the end the add-on to the entry price for a new deal, called funds transfer pricing
(FTP), is
FTP = ∆TRC + ∆KVA, (8)
where ∆KVA is the incremental risk margin of the new deal.
As we shall understand in more detail later, the TRC can be interpreted as the
risk-neutral contribution to the FTP (8), accordingly we sometimes call it risk-neutral
XVA. The KVA can be interpreted as a risk-adjustment.
Note that banks are market makers and, as such, they are price makers. Bank
clients are price takers willing to accept a loss in a trade for the sake of receiving
benefits which become apparent only once one includes their real investment portfolio,
which cannot be done explicitly in a pricing model. In an asymmetric setup with a
price maker and a price taker, the price maker passes his costs to the price taker.
Things get a bit tricky for bilateral trades between two financial intermediaries. In
this case each party will try to have the other pay its costs. This in general would
result in no deal but in practice translates into a shared loss somewhere in the middle
of the range, depending on which party has the strongest contractual power.
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4 Dynamic Setup
The above balance sheet reasoning depicts a framework which is qualitatively correct,
but is insufficient to provide a model of CET1 fluctuations needed as an input into
KVA calculations, or to quantify finer effects such as the intertwining between economic
capital and FVA that results from the possibility to use economic capital as a source
of funding. For this, a classical continuous-time mathematical finance implementation
of the above ideas is required, which is the purpose of the remainder of the paper.
Let (Ω,A,G,Q), with G = (Gt)t∈R+ , represent a suitable stochastic basis, with
expectation (resp. conditional expectation) denoted by E (resp. Et), such that all the
processes (resp. random times) of interest are G adapted (resp. G stopping times).
Target reserve capital valuation will be based on a no-arbitrage martingale condi-
tion with respect to a risk-neutral pricing measure. By contrast, economic capital and
KVA assess risk and its cost, which should be computed under the historical probability
measure (at least in principle, let aside implementation issues). Hence, the probability
measure Q of choice in Part II typically differs from the one to be used in Part III.
The connection between the above balance-sheet analysis and the dynamic analysis
that follows sits in the way this dynamic model should be used in practice. Namely,
time 0 in the dynamic model represents the time a new deal is considered. For the
purpose of computing incremental XVAs for this new trade, the (back-to-back hedged)
derivative portfolio of the bank, including the new trade, is modelled on a run-off basis
until its final maturity T or the bank’s default time τ . Hence, the time horizon of the
model is τ¯ = τ ∧ T.
We denote by L = TRC−RC the loss process (cumulative realized loss and profit) of
the back-to-back hedged portfolio. An accrued loss y represents the value T˜RC0− R˜C0
attained at time 0 by the loss process of the portfolio without the new deal. Hence, an
initial condition L0 = y states that
RC0 = TRC0 − (T˜RC0 − R˜C0) = R˜C0 + (TRC0 − T˜RC0).
In other words, the incremental amount ∆RC = RC0 − R˜C0 of reserve capital that
should be charged to the client for the new deal at time 0 equals TRC0 − T˜RC0 =
∆TRC, which is consistent with the balance sheet formula (6).
Similarly, in order to adjust the size of the KVA account from the starting value
K˜VA0 to the new value KVA0 reflecting the inclusion of the new deal, the bank must
pass on to the client an incremental KVA amount equal to the difference ∆KVA =
KVA0 − K˜VA0. In the end, the total XVA charge passed on to the client of the new
deal is given by the FTP formula (8).
Part II
Cost of Capital
The cost of capital is the cost of remunerating the bank shareholders in order to
compensate the latter for placing capital at risk.
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If markets were complete and all payoffs were perfectly replicable, then no capital
would be at risk and no compensation would be required. However, in incomplete
markets this is not the case. Shareholders’ capital is exposed to financial risk and
the risk compensation needs to be sourced from clients in proportion to a measure for
capital consumption.
The economic capital (EC) of a bank, which is its loss-absorbing resource devoted
to cope with exceptional losses beyond reserve capital, consists of the sum between
shareholders’ capital at risk (SCR) and retained earnings (KVA). Regarding economic
capital, the FRTB talks about a VaR replacement, defining EC as expected shortfall
(ES) with 97.5% confidence (cf. Artzner, Delbean, Eber, and Heath (1999)). This
however refers to market risk, not CET1. On the other hand, Basel II Pillar II defines
economic capital as the year-on-year 99% VaR of (−CET1). Putting together the two,
we arrived to our updated variant of EC defined as
The year-on-year 97.5% ES for (−CET1) (9)
(see (19) for a refined technical definition also integrating a Solvency-like accounting
condition). The interpretation of this expected shortfall is that EC is seized to a level
such to absorb average losses deriving by extreme levels of depletion of reserve capital
occurring in the worst out of every forty years (cf. Figure 1).
The level of compensation required by shareholders on SCR is driven by market
considerations. Typically, investors in banks expect a hurdle rate h of about 10%−12%.
When a bank charges cost of capital to clients, these revenues are accounted for as
profits. Unfortunately, since prevailing accounting standards for derivative securities
are based on the theoretical assumption of market completeness, they do not envision
a mechanism to retain these earnings for the purpose of remunerating capital across
the entire life of transactions, that can be as long as decades. In complete markets,
there is no justification for risk capital. Hence, profits are immediately distributable.
A strategy of earning retention beyond the end of the ongoing accounting year (or
quarter) is still possible as in all firms, but this would be regarded as purely a business
decision, not subject to financial regulation under the Basel III Accord.
An argument as of why banking retained earnings policies should be regulated is
related to the so called “leverage ratchet effect” and is discussed in Admati, DeMarzo,
Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013). According to their paper, shareholders have a ten-
dency to ratchet up leverage even if this comes to detriment to the value for the firm
as a whole. In the case of banks, the ratchet effect is compounded by the mechanics
of capital remuneration under current accounting rules: since earnings received from
clients to remunerate capital are accounted for as day-one profits, they are immedi-
ately distributable unless so decided by the bank board of directors. This leads to an
explosive instability characteristic of a Ponzi scheme. Initially, derivative markets grow
driven by trades used for hedging purposes and essential for the efficient functioning of
the economy. As volumes for derivative markets keep growing, the increasing need of
financing capital attracted by these derivative portfolios leads to the onset of a phase
where new derivative asset classes are created for speculation purposes only.
For instance, if a bank starts off today by entering a 30-year swap with a client, the
bank books a profit. Assuming the trade is perfectly hedged, the profit is distributable
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at once. The following year, the bank still needs capital to absorb the risk of the
29-year swap in the portfolio. But how can the bank remunerate shareholders if the
profits from this trade have already been distributed the previous year? Simple: lever
up! The bank sells and hedges another swap, books a new profit and distributes
the dividend to shareholders that are now posting capital for both swaps. As long
as trading volumes grow exponentially, the scheme self-sustains. When exponential
growth stops, the bank’s return on equity crashes.
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 can be largely explained along these lines (see Fig-
ure 2). In the aftermath of the crisis, the first casualty was the return on equity for the
fixed income business as profits had already been distributed and market-level hurdle
rates could not be sustained by portfolio growth. Interestingly enough however, in the
Figure 2: Ponzi scheme in the last financial crisis (source: OCC Q3 2015 Quarterly
Bank Trading Revenue Report).
insurance domain, Solvency II (2004), unlike Basel III, does regulate the distribution of
retained earnings through a mechanism tied to so called “risk margins”, which directly
inspires the KVA metric discussed in this article. Also, the accounting standards set
out in IFRS 4 Phase II (see IFRS (2012, 2013) are consistent with Solvency II and
include a treatment for risk margins that has no analogue in the banking domain. See
Wu¨thrich and Merz (2013), Eisele and Artzner (2011) and Salzmann and Wu¨thrich
(2010) regarding the risk margin and cost of capital actuarial literature.
The purpose of this part is to discuss a framework for assessing cost of capital
(KVA) for a bank, pass it on to the bank’s clients and distribute it gradually to the
bank’s shareholders through a dividend policy which would be sustainable even in the
limit case of a portfolio held on a run-off basis, with no new trades ever entered in
the future. Solvency II requires in addition that EC must be higher than the cost
of capital (i.e. the KVA). In this paper, we compute the KVA also respecting this
additional Solvency II constraint.
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5 KVA Equations
Let ES = ESt(L) denotes the 97.5% conditional expected shortfall of the one-year-
ahead loss (Lt+1−Lt) of the bank computed on a going-concern basis, i.e. conditionally
to bank survival, that is, writing Qt for Et1:
ESt(L) =
Et
[
(Lt+1 − Lt)1{Lt+1−Lt≥VaRt(L)}∩{τ>t+1}
]
Qt
[{Lt+1 − Lt ≥ VaRt(L)} ∩ {τ > t+ 1}] , (10)
where
VaRt(L) = inf
{
` :
Qt
[{Lt+1 − Lt ≥ `} ∩ {τ > t+ 1}]
Qt({τ > t+ 1}) ≤ 2.5%
}
. (11)
For KVA computations entailing capital projections over decades, an equilibrium
view based on Pillar II economic capital (EC) is more attractive than the ever-changing
Pillar I regulatory charges supposed to approximate it, see Pykhtin (2012). However,
Pillar I regulatory capital requirements can be incorporated into our approach if wished
by replacing ES by its maximum with the regulatory capital pertaining to the portfolio.
We denote by r a G progressive overnight index swap (OIS) rate process and by
βt = e
− ∫ t0 rsds the corresponding discount factor. The OIS rate is altogether the best
market proxy for a risk-free rate and the reference rate for the remuneration of cash
collateral. Let C ≥ ES represent a putative economic capital process for the bank. To
compute the KVA we ask the following question: what should be the process for the
size K = Kt(C) of a KVA account, accruing at the OIS rate r, in order to generate an
average (expected) remuneration to shareholders equal to h(Ct −Kt)dt at each point
in time t ∈ [0, τ¯ ]? The reason why (Ct −Kt) rather than Ct appears in this formula is
that retained earnings are loss-absorbing and therefore part of the economic capital.
Therefore, shareholders’ capital at risk, which by assumption is remunerated at the
hurdle rate h, only corresponds to the difference (Ct −Kt).
Summarizing, we are looking for a process Kt that satisfies the terminal condition
Kτ¯ = 0 and obeys the equation
dKt +
(
h(Ct −Kt)− rKt
)
dt is a local martingale on [0, τ¯ ]. (12)
The differential specification (12) is in the form of a linear backward stochastic differ-
ential equation (BSDE)1, equivalent to the integrated form (14) below. As we demon-
strate in Lemma 5.1 below, the solution K = Kt(C) to this equation is unique. Fur-
thermore, since the equation is linear, its solution is given by the explicit KVA formula
in (15).
But the difference (Ct−Kt) represents shareholder capital at risk and must therefore
be non-negative in order to satisfy a Solvency-like accounting condition (cf. Sect. 6).
If one accounts for the corresponding constraint C ≥ K, then the BSDE becomes of
non-linear type (13) with a Lipschitz coefficient.
We denote by Hp the space of ·p-integrable processes over [0, τ¯ ], for any p ≥ 1.
1We refer the reader to Cre´pey (2013) for an introductory financial modeling BSDE reference.
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Lemma 5.1 Consider the following BSDEs:
KVAt = Et
∫ τ¯
t
(
hmax(ESs,KVAs)− (rs + h)KVAs
)
ds, t ∈ [0, τ¯ ] (13)
Kt = Et
∫ τ¯
t
(
hCs − (rs + h)Ks
)
ds, t ∈ [0, τ¯ ], (14)
to be solved for respective processes K and KVA. Assuming that r is bounded from below
and that ES (respectively C) and r are in H2, then the BSDE (13) (respectively (14))
is well posed in H2, where well-posedness includes existence, uniqueness, comparison
and the standard a priori bound and error BSDE estimates. The H2 solution K to
(14) admits the explicit representation
Kt = hEt
∫ τ¯
t
e−
∫ s
t (ru+h)duCsds, t ∈ [0, τ¯ ]. (15)
Proof. Let, for k ∈ R,
ft(k) = h
(
max(ESt, k)− k
)− rtk = hmax (ESt, k)− (rt + h)k, (16)
which is the coefficient of the KVA BSDE (13). For any real k, k′ ∈ R and t ∈ [0, τ¯ ], it
holds(
ft(k)− ft(k′)
)
(k − k′) = −(rt + h)(k − k′)2 + h
(
max(ESt, k)−max(ESt, k′)
)
(k − k′))
≤ −rt(k − k′)2 ≤ C(k − k′)2
(having assumed r bounded from below), so that the coefficient f satisfies the so-called
monotonicity condition. Moreover, for |k| ≤ k¯, we have that
|f·(k)− f·(0)| ≤ hmax
(|ES|, k¯)+ |h+ r|k¯ + hES+.
Hence, assuming that ES and r are in H2, the following integrability conditions hold:
sup
|k|≤k¯
|f·(k)− f·(0)| ∈ H1, for any k¯ > 0, and f·(0) ∈ H2. (17)
Therefore, by application of classical BSDE results (see e.g. Kruse and Popier (2015,
Sect. 5)), the BSDE (13) is well-posed in H2, where well-posedness includes existence,
uniqueness, comparison and the a priori bound and error BSDE estimates. Even sim-
pler computations prove the statement regarding the linear BSDE (14). Hence, (14) is
well-posed in H2. Moreover, (15) obviously solves (14).
Note that, in case some exceptional “40-yearly” loss event occurs, according to
the total loss-absorbing capacity standard TLAC (see Stability Board (2015)), debt is
converted into equity to replenish CET1 (cf. Figure 1). Within our proposed treatment
for risk margins, this conversion would replenish both shareholder capital at risk and
the KVA. This explains why the stopping times of exceptional losses do not appear in
the above KVA metric.
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6 The Solvency II Constraint on the KVA
Under the insurance Solvency capital requirement, economic capital is the sum between
shareholder capital at risk (SCR) and risk margins (the insurance analog of the KVA).
Some actuarial literature dwells with the puzzle according to which the calculation of
the risk margins depends on economic capital projections in the future while economic
capital itself depends on the risk margins, an apparently circular dependency (see
e.g. Salzmann and Wu¨thrich (2010, Sect. 4.4), Robert (2013) and Eisele and Artzner
(2011)).
This paper addresses the problem of circular dependency as follows: First, we com-
pute the economic capital according to some risk measure, where the economic capital
corresponds to the sum (SCR + KVA). Then, we define KVA using economic capital
projections discounted at a hurdle rate (cf. (15)). The SCR is defined a posteriori
as the difference (EC − KVA) (see Figure 1). However, we need to account for the
additional constraint that KVA ≤ EC. Otherwise this would break the Solvency-like
accounting condition SCR ≥ 0 (discussed after (18)) and KVA would cease to be a
supermartingale and to decrease as a function of the hurdle rate h. This additional
constraint is handled by considering the modified KVA (i.e. the KVA) defined in terms
of the KVA BSDE (13).
To emphasize the dependence of K on C, we henceforth denote by K(C) the
solution (15) to the linear BSDE (14). In view of Lemma 5.1, the process K = K(C)
defined by (15) is the unique sustainable dividend policy with hurdle rate h associated
with a putative economic capital process C ∈ H2. The set of admissible economic
capital processes is
C = {C ∈ H2;C ≥ max(ES,K(C))}, (18)
where C ≥ ES is the risk acceptability condition and C ≥ K(C) corresponds to a
Solvency-like accounting condition, expressing a switching (or transferability) property
of the bank to new shareholders if need be (cf. the respective conditions (b) and (a)
and their discussion in Wu¨thrich and Merz (2013, pages 270 and 271) and see also the
refined discussion in Sect. A.2). We define
EC = max(ES,KVA) (19)
in H2, where KVA is the H2 solution to the BSDE (13).
Remark 6.1 In many cases as in our concluding figure 3, we have that EC = ES. The
inequality stops holding when the hurdle rate is high enough and the term structure
of EC starts very low and has a sharp peak in a few years.
Note that the KVA solution to (14) also solves a linear BSDE (14) (and is therefore
given by the linear KVA formula (15)), but for the implicit data C = EC.
The next result shows that EC is a an optimal admissible economic capital process,
optimal in the sense of smallest and with the cheapest ensuing cost of capital, which
is shown to be nondecreasing in the hurdle rate h.
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Theorem 6.1 Under the assumptions of Lemma 5.1, we have:
(i) KVA = K(EC).
(ii) EC = min C,KVA = minC∈CK(C).
(iii) If ES ≥ 0, then KVA is nondecreasing in h.
Proof. (i) KVA is in H2 and, by virtue of (13), we have, for t ∈ [0, τ¯ ],
KVAt = Et
∫ τ¯
t
(
hmax
(
ESs,KVAs
)− (rs + h)KVAs)ds
= Et
∫ τ¯
t
(
hECs − (rs + h)KVAs
)
ds,
so that the process KVA solves the linear BSDE (14) for C = EC ∈ H2. Hence
KVA = K(EC) follows by uniqueness of an H2 solution to the linear BSDE (14)
established in Lemma 5.1.
(ii) We just saw that KVA = K(EC), hence
EC = max(ES,KVA) = max
(
ES,K(EC)
)
.
Therefore EC ∈ C. Moreover, for any C ∈ C (cf. (16))
ft(Kt(C)) = hmax
(
ESt,Kt(C)
)− (rt + h)Kt(C) ≤ hCt − (h+ rt)Kt(C).
Hence, the coefficient f of the KVA BSDE (13) never exceeds the coefficient of the lin-
ear BSDE (14) when both coefficients are evaluated at the solution Kt(C) of the linear
BSDE (14). Since these are BSDEs with equal (null) terminal condition, the compar-
ison theorem applied to the BSDEs (13) and (14) yields KVA ≤ K(C). Consequently,
KVA = minC∈CK(C) and, for any C ∈ C,
C ≥ max(ES,K(C)) ≥ max(ES,KVA) = EC,
hence EC = min C.
(iii) If ES ≥ 0, then, as visible in (16), the coefficient ft(k) of the KVA BSDE (13) is
nondecreasing in the hurdle rate parameter h. So is therefore in turn the H2 solution
KVA to (13), by the comparison theorem applied to the BSDE (13) for different values
of h.
Part III
Reserve Capital and Target Reserve
Capital
Having designed the XVA risk-adjustment methodology in the form of a KVA defined
as cost of capital, the companion task is to specify a proper modeling framework for the
loss process L to be used as input in these cost of capital computations. By doing so,
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we also improve the FVA models in Albanese et al. (2015) or Cre´pey and Song (2015)
(see also Albanese and Andersen (2014) and Andersen, Duffie, and Song (2016)).
In this part the probability measure Q denotes a risk-neutral pricing measure cali-
brated to the market.
Liquidation and funding costs, which are primarily driven by counterparty risk,
are hard to hedge in practice. Reserve capital (RC) is used for dealing with expected
liquidation and funding costs as they occur. Exceptional losses are accounted for by
economic capital.
At each trade, incremental UCVA, FVA and MVA amounts are charged to clients
and flow into the RC account (cf. (6)).
In between trades, liquidation and funding costs deplete the RC account, whereas
the target reserve capital (TRC) fluctuates according to model valuation computed
assuming the portfolio held under a run-off basis.
As a result, a discrepancy L = TRC−RC develops between the reserve capital and
its target value. Economic capital is required from the bank in order to deal with the
fluctuations of this loss process L. To make the connection with (9), note that, in the
case of a portfolio held on a run-off basis, gross equity, which is the sum between gross
shareholder capital and the KVA, is constant. For instance, if the risk increases on
the market, i.e. if EC = SCR + KVA increases, then this must be compensated by an
equal decrease in uninvested equity. This should be contrasted with what happens at a
new deal where, as mentioned before (1), it is only the gross shareholder capital (gross
equity net of the KVA) that is constant, but an incremental KVA can be sourced from
the client. In both cases, the debt of the bank is also constant. Hence, under our run-
off and back-to-back market hedge assumptions on the bank portfolio, the fluctuations
of the process L = TRC − RC are nothing but the fluctuations of (−CET1) (cf. the
CET1 defining equation (5) and Figure 1).
Now, for a proper modeling of the fluctuations of the loss process L = TRC− RC
(or, equivalently, of (−CET1)) required as input to our KVA computations, dynamic
modeling of the reserve capital and of the target reserve capital are required. Our
modelling principle in this regard is that, in order to prevent arbitrage, the loss process
L = TRC− RC should follow a risk-neutral local martingale.
The principles of no arbitrage and risk neutral valuation have seen successive devel-
opments in de Finetti (1931, 1937), Modigliani and Miller (1958), Harrison and Pliska
(1981) and Delbaen and Schachermayer (2005) and are surveyed in Duffie (2010). As
recalled in Part I, contra-liability entries (such as the DVA) price cashflows which occur
at the time of bank default and have an impact on the worth of bank debt by affecting
the recovery rate. However, only the interest of shareholders matters in bank’s man-
agerial decisions. Hence, in our setup, we postulate a risk-neutral local martingale for
L = TRC− RC when all the contra-liabilities are ignored.
First, we write a shareholders-centric self-financing condition ignoring contra-liability
cash-flows, which results in a forward SDE for RC reflecting the counterparty default
and margining funding losses. The initial condition for this SDE is RC0 = TRC0 − y,
where the accrued loss L0 = y is the negative of the initial endowment of the portfolio.
As illustrated in a concrete setup in Sect. 9, a no arbitrage risk-neutral local mar-
tingale condition on the loss process L = TRC−RC is then equivalent to a backward
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SDE for the TRC process with terminal condition TRCτ¯ = 0, coupled with the forward
SDE for RC.
This leads us to a forward-backward SDE (FBSDE) to be satisfied by the pair
of processes (RC,TRC). Moreover, since economic capital can be used for funding
purposes, there will be a feedback loop from economic capital into the FVA component
of the TRC: The higher economic capital, the lower the FVA.
7 Margining, Partial Hedging, Funding and Losses Real-
ization Schemes
The data of the (RC,TRC) FBSDE reflect derivative portfolio margining, partial hedg-
ing, funding and losses realization schemes, which we specify in this section.
We consider (n+1) financial entities trading together, the bank and n counterparties
such as sovereigns, corporate entities and possibly other banks or financial insitutions,
indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, with default times τi and survival indicators J
i = 1[0,τi). The
bank is also default prone, with default time τ and survival indicator J = 1[0,τ). We
suppose that all these default times admit a finite intensity. In particular, defaults
occur at any given G predictable time with zero probability (but we do not exclude
simultaneous defaults).
To mitigate counterparty risk, the bank and its counterparties exchange variation
and initial margin. Variation margin typically consists of cash that is re-hypothecable,
meaning that received variation margin can be reused for funding purposes, and is
remunerated at OIS by the receiving party. Initial margin typically consists of liquid
assets deposited in a segregated account, such as government bonds, which naturally
pay coupons or otherwise accrue in value. The poster of the collateral receives no
compensation, except for the natural accrual or coupons of its collateral.
As happens in practice in the current regulatory environment, the back-to-back
market hedge of the derivative portfolio of the bank is assumed to be with other
financial institutions and attracts variation margin at zero threshold. On top of its
back-to-back market hedge, the bank may setup a counterparty risk (partial) hedge η,
which is a predictable and locally bounded vector process of dynamic positions in some
hedging assets. We denote by M the vector-valued gain process of unit positions in
these hedging assets, assumed a risk neutral vector local martingale. As explained in
the comments following the assumption 4.4.1 in Cre´pey, Bielecki, and Brigo (2014, page
96)2, this assumption on M rules out arbitrage opportunities in the market spanned
by hedging instruments3. The counterparty risk hedge η is a replicating strategy if the
ensuing loss process L = TRC−RC vanishes almost surely, in which case the ensuing
KVA vanishes. As counterparty risk is hard to hedge in practice, the concept of a
counterparty risk replicating strategy is a rather theoretical abstraction. A broader
notion, which can be related to the notion of optimal replicating portfolio in Eisele
and Artzner (2011), would be that of a KVA (or perhaps FTP) minimizing hedge, but
2Or Cre´pey (2015, Part I, Assumption 4.1) in article version.
3Provided one restricts attention to hedging strategies resulting in a wealth process bounded from
below (see Bielecki and Rutkowski (2015, Corollary 3.1) for a formal statement).
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even the idea of minimizing over η is probably overly optimistic, as banks would not
really optimize but rather select a “suitable” η.
The derivative portfolio management strategy of the bank needs to be funded. We
assume that the bank can invest at the OIS rate rt and obtain unsecured funding at
the rate (rt + λt), where the unsecured funding spread λ can be proxied by the bank’s
CDS spread. The cash held by the bank, whether borrowed or received as variation
margin, is deemed fungible across netting sets in a unique funding set. Initial margin
is funded separately at a blended spread λ¯ depending on the IM funding policy (see
Sect. 9.3).
We assume that losses (or profits) accumulate before being released at each of
an increasing sequence of G-predictable stopping times 0 < t1 < . . . < tν ≤ τ¯ . In
other words, the reserve capital process is reset to its theoretical target level TRC at
times tl. These are typically quarter ends for bank profits, released as dividends, vs
recapitalization managerial decision times for losses, and for notational convenience
we also introduce t0 = 0. The random integer ν corresponds to the last dividend date
either prior to default or the one prior to the last maturity in the portfolio. At times
tl (for l ≥ 1), shareholders either realize a loss or a gain (Ltl − Ltl−1), depending on
whether reserve capital is below or above its theoretical target value. If the process L
is a continuous-time risk-neutral local martingale, then cumulative realised losses are
given by the discrete time risk-neutral martingale (Ltl)0≤ν (starting from the accrued
loss L0 = y), which expresses the viability of the underlying pricing rule.
We denote by R̂C the TRC-reset version of the process RC, such that R̂C is reset
to TRC at each losses realization time tl ∈ (0, τ¯ ] and has the same dynamics as the
process RC between these times. Hence, the process R̂C corresponds to the realized
reserve capital of the bank, which is the size of the funding pocket provided by reserve
capital. By definition:
Lemma 7.1 For t ∈ [0, τ¯ ], we have (in two equivalent forms):
R̂Ct = RCt +
∑
0<tl≤t
(TRCtl − TRCtl−1 − (RCtl − RCtl−1)),
RCt = R̂Ct −
∑
0<tl≤t
(TRCtl − R̂Ctl−),
(20)
so that RC = TRC ⇐⇒ R̂C = TRC (this is the theoretical case of a counterparty
risk replicating hedge η). In addition, we have R̂Ctl = TRCtl , and R̂Ctl− = TRCtl−1 +
RCtl − RCtl−1 , for every l = 1, . . . , ν.
When the frequency of the losses realization schedule (tl) goes from 0 (case of a terminal
realization of the losses) to infinity (limiting case of a continuous-time realization of
the losses), the realized reserve capital R̂C “interpolates” from RC to TRC. In the
latter limiting case, Lemma 7.1 does not apply as such, the connection between R̂C,
RC, and TRC becoming that
R̂C = TRC, (21)
independently of the RC hedge η.
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Note that the retained earnings cashflows −(dKVAt − rtKVAtdt) also accumulate
in a separate cash account before being released at the tl, so that the netted dividend
at tl is the negative of
Ltl − Ltl−1 +
∫ tl
tl−1
(dKVAt − rtKVAtdt). (22)
In case the amount (22) is positive, we assume that managers recapitalise the bank
(thus diluting existing shareholders) to make up for the shortfall in reserve capital.
In addition to the funding pocket provided by R̂C, a bank can also post economic
capital as variation margin. To model this circumstance, we imagine having an ac-
count for economic capital and a separate one for reserve capital. Economic capital
is internally lent to the reserve capital account and is remunerated at OIS rates. The
portion of economic capital which is then posted as variation margin is remunerated
at OIS rates by the receiving counterparty, while the unused difference is deposited in
an external account, thus earning OIS.
8 Exposures at Defaults
In the remainder of the paper we apply the above XVA principles in the concrete
setup of a bank engaged into bilateral trading of a derivative portfolio split into several
netting sets corresponding to counterparties indexed by i = 1, . . . , n.
Let MtMit be the mark-to-market of the i-th netting set, i.e. the trade additive
risk-neutral conditional expectation of future discounted promised cash flows, ignoring
counterparty risk and funding costs. Let
P it = MtM
i
t −VMit (23)
be the net spot exposure of the i-th netting set, i.e. the valuation of the netting set
minus the corresponding (algebraic) variation margin VMit received by the bank. In
addition to the variation margin VMit that flows between them, the counterparty i
and the bank post respective initial margins IMi and IM
i
t in some segregated accounts.
Finally, we denote by Ri the recovery rate of the counterparty i.
In principle, one should explicitly model a positive liquidation period, usually es-
timated to a few days, corresponding to the time interval between the default of a
counterparty (or the bank) and the liquidation of its portfolio. This liquidation period
is important in practice since, once a position is fully collateralized in terms of variation
margin, the gap risk related to the slippage of MtMit and to unpaid cash-flows during
the liquidation period becomes the first order residual risk and the motivation for the
initial margins. A positive liquidation period is explicitly introduced in Armenti and
Cre´pey (2015) and Cre´pey and Song (2015) (see also Brigo and Pallavicini (2014)) and
involves introducing the random variable:
MtMiτi+δt + δMtM
i
τi+δt
−VMiτi (24)
where δt is the liquidation period and δMtMiτi+δt is the accrued value of all the cash
flows owed by the counterparty during the liquidation period.
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To alleviate the notation in this paper, we take the limit as δt→ 0 and approximate
(24) through the value at τi of some G-optional process Qi. Such approximation is
commonly used in numerical simulations for rendering gap risk.
Another related issue is wrong-way risk, i.e. the adverse dependence between the
XVA exposure of the bank and the credit risk of its counterparties, which can be
rendered by a feedback impact of defaults on the processes MtMi of the survivors.
This impact can also be captured in our variable Qiτi (see Cre´pey and Song (2015)).
9 Risk-Neutral XVA FBSDE
Let RC and TRC denote putative, to-be-determined reserve capital and target reserve
capital processes of the bank.
Note that regulators require banks to deduct from CET1 the unilateral UCVA,
while the fair valuation of first-to-default risk is given by the metric FTDCVA. This
spoils the financial meaning of CET1 as being the fair valuation of equity capital. In
this paper, we choose to restore this meaning by postulating that, at the default time
of the bank τ , a fictitious wealth transfer of amount
UCVAτ = Eτ
∑
τ<τi
β−1τ βτi(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+, (25)
occurs from the shareholders to the creditors of the bank.
In order to emphasize the dependence of EC in L, we write EC = ECt(L). We write
δt for a Dirac measure at time t. Collecting all the shareholders sensitive cash flows in
22
a contra-liability myopic perspective, we obtain:
RC0 = TRC0−y and, for t ∈ (0, τ¯ ],
dRCt = −
∑
i 6=0
(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+δτi(dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Counterparty default losses
−
(
(rt + λt)
(∑
i 6=0
J itP
i
t − ECt(L)− R̂Ct
)+ − rt(∑
i 6=0
J itP
i
t − ECt(L)− R̂Ct
)−)
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Costs/benefits of funding the VM of the back-to-back hedge of the
portfolio net of the VM of the portfolio itself (this is all included in
the P it ) and of the EC and R̂C funding pockets (see Sect. 7)
− (rt + λ¯t)
∑
i 6=0
J it IM
i
tdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
IM funding costs
+ rt
(∑
i 6=0
J it (P
i
t + IM
i
t)
)
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
OIS-earning exchanged VMs and posted IMs
− rtECt(L)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest paid on economic capital (see the last paragraph of Sect. 7)
+ ηtdMt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Counterparty risk hedging gain
− UCVAτδτ (dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
UCVA transfer at own default time of the bank
= −
∑
i 6=0
(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+δτi(dt)−UCVAτδτ (dt)
−
(
λt
(∑
i 6=0
J itP
i
t − ECt(L)− R̂Ct
)+
+ λ¯t
∑
i 6=0
J it IM
i
t − rtR̂Ct
)
dt+ ηtdMt,
(26)
where R̂C is the TRC-reset version of the process RC as of (20), which corresponds to
the realized reserve capital of the bank. In view of obtaining a local martingale for the
difference L between TRC and RC, the forward SDE (26) for RC suggests to set
TRCt = Et
∑
t<τi≤τ¯
(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+ + Et
[
1{t<τ<T}UCVAτ
]
+ Et
∫ τ¯
t
(
λs
(∑
i 6=0
J isP
i
s − ECs(L)− R̂Cs
)+
+ λ¯s
∑
i 6=0
J isIM
i
s − rsR̂Cs
)
ds, t ∈ [0, τ¯ ].
(27)
In fact, assuming that a pair of processes (RC,TRC) satisfies (26) and (27), then we
have a continuous-time martingale L = TRC− RC, as desired.
This leads us to the following formal definition, stated as a risk-neutral local mar-
tingale condition in order to avoid unnecessary integrability conditions.
Definition 9.1 Given a counterparty risk hedge η, let a pair-process (RC,TRC) sat-
23
isfy the following bank’s risk-neutral XVA FBSDE on [0, τ¯ ]:
TRCτ¯ = 0 and L = TRC− RC is a risk-neutral local martingale null at time 0,
where RC0 = TRC0 − y and, for t ∈ (0, τ¯ ],
dRCt = −
∑
i 6=0
(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+δτi(dt)−UCVAτδτ (dt)
−
(
λt
(∑
i 6=0
J itP
i
t − ECt(L)− R̂Ct
)+
+ λ¯t
∑
i 6=0
J it IM
i
t − rtR̂Ct
)
dt+ ηtdMt,
(28)
in which R̂C is the TRC-reset version of the RC process (cf. (20)). We then call
TRC the bank target reserve capital (or risk-neutral XVA) process associated with the
counterparty risk hedge η, with loss process L.
9.1 Modelling Choice for the Losses Realization Schedule
The impact of the losses realization schedule (tl) is quite moderate in the risk-neutral
XVA FBSDE (28), as it only changes the frequency of the resets of R̂C. This is con-
sistent with the fact that, were it not for the market imperfections considered in this
paper, there would be no impact at all of the schedule of realization of the losses, by
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem.
In particular, in the limiting case of a continuous-time realization of the losses, with
R̂C = TRC (cf. (21) and the comments following Lemma 7.1), the TRC equation (27)
is rewritten as
TRCt = Et
∑
t<τi≤τ¯
(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+ + Et
[
1{t<τ<T}UCVAτ
]
+ Et
∫ τ¯
t
(
λs(
∑
i 6=0
J isP
i
s − ECs(L)− TRCs)+ + λ¯s
∑
i 6=0
J isIM
i
s − rsTRCs
)
ds, t ∈ [0, τ¯ ],
(29)
i.e.
TRCt = Et
∑
t<τi
β−1t βτi(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
UCVAt
+Et
∫ τ¯
t
β−1t βsλ¯s
∑
i 6=0
J isIM
i
sds︸ ︷︷ ︸
MVAt
+ Et
∫ τ¯
t
β−1t βsλs
(∑
i 6=0
J isP
i
s − ECs(L)− TRCs
)+
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
FVAt
, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ¯ ,
(30)
which is consistent with the balance sheet equation (7) whilst giving a more precise
meaning to the UCVA, FVA and MVA terms. Note that the UCVA and MVA processes
in (30) are exogenous, so that (30) is equivalent to defining TRC = UCVA+MVA+FVA
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where FVA is given implicitly through
FVAt = Et
∫ τ¯
t
β−1t βsλs
(∑
i 6=0
J isP
i
s − ECs(L)
−UCVAs −MVAs − FVAs
)+
ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ¯ .
(31)
By comparison, in the other extreme case R̂C = RC case of a terminal realization
of the losses, the TRC equation (27) that is implicit in the martingale condition for L
in (28) is rewritten as (assuming integrability)
TRCt = Et
∑
t<τi≤τ¯
(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+ + Et
[
1{t<τ<T}UCVAτ
]
+ Et
∫ τ¯
t
(
λs
(∑
i 6=0
J isP
i
s − ECs(L)− RCs
)+
+ λ¯s
∑
i 6=0
J isIM
i
s − rsRCs
)
ds, t ∈ [0, τ¯ ]
(32)
The connection with the balance-sheet equation (7) is a bit less nice than with (30).
As a consequence, since a modelling choice has to be made regarding the (tl) any-
way, we assume henceforth a continuous-time realization of the losses, with R̂C = TRC
in (28), or, equivalently (assuming integrability), a TRC as of (30) and a FVA as of
(31).
9.2 Entry Price Versus Fair Valuation
The TRC of Definition 9.1 is only fair to the shareholders of the bank and if the cost
of capital is ignored. As already seen from a balance sheet point of view in Sect. 2, an
approach fair to the bank as a whole (shareholders plus bondholders altogether) and
to its counterparties, i.e. a symmetric XVA approach, reckons contra-liabilities:
• The DVA of the bank, which correspond to the CVA from the point of view of
its counterparties;
• The difference between the UCVA and the FTDCVA;
• The FDA (akin to the DVA2 in Hull and White (2012)), which is equal to the
FVA;
• The MDA, which is equal to the MVA.
Adding all the contra-liability cash-flows into (26) and exploiting the above-mentioned
cancellations (cf. also Sect. 2), we would end-up with the following alternative to (30)
(in the limiting case (21) of a continuous-time realization of the losses):
TRCt = Et
∑
t<τi≤τ¯
β−1t βτi(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
FTDCVAt
−
∑
t<τi≤τ¯
β−1t βτi(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IM
i
τi)
−
︸ ︷︷ ︸
FTDDVAt
, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ¯ .
(33)
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Such a symmetric TRC yields an objective, reference metric for the FTP, ignoring the
market inefficiencies accounted for by the entry price XVA given as UCVA + FVA +
MVA + KVA (cf. (30) and (8)).
9.3 About Initial Margins
The MVA depends strongly on the strategy that is postulated regarding the funding
of the initial margins. For instance, instead of an unsecured funding scheme resulting
in λ¯ = λ, one can assume that initial margins are funded through a specialist lender
that lends only IM and, in case of default of the bank, receives back the portion of
IM unused to cover losses. The exposure of the specialist lender to the default of the
bank is given by (1 − R)∑i 6=0 J iτ((Qiτ )− ∧ IMiτ), where R is the bank recovery rate
(typically taken as 40%). Denoting by γ the risk-neutral default intensity process of
the bank, the ensuing instantaneous IM funding charge for the bank is (assuming here
for simplicity G-predictable processes Qi)
γt(1−R)
∑
i 6=0
J it
(
(Qit)
− ∧ IMit
)
= λt
∑
i 6=0
J it
(
(Qit)
− ∧ IMit
)
.
By identification with the general form λ¯t
∑
i 6=0 J
i
t IM
i
t postulated for instantaneous
initial margin costs in (26), this corresponds to
λ¯t =
∑
i 6=0 J
i
t
(
(Qit)
− ∧ IMit
)∑
i 6=0 J
i
t IM
i
t
λt.
Such a blended spread λ¯t can be much smaller than the unsecured funding spread λ.
A more detailed discussion is in Albanese et al. (2015).
Part IV
Implementation
In this final part of the paper we implement the above XVA approach by means of
nested Monte Carlo simulations that are used for solving the risk-neutral XVA FBSDE
(28) for (RC,TRC) iteratively, in the limiting case (30) of a continuous-time realization
of the losses (i.e. R̂C = TRC). The ensuing loss process L = TRC−RC is then plugged
as input data of the KVA computations. The paper is concluded by two case studies.
10 Iterative Algorithm
10.1 Counterparty Risk Replication BSDE
Unless λ = 0, the FBSDE (28) is made nonstandard by the term ECt(L), which entails
the conditional law of the one-year-ahead increments of the process L = TRC − RC.
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As a starting point in the search for a solution to our FBSDE, we define the following
counterparty risk replication BSDE for a process TRC? :
TRC?t = Et
∑
t<τi
β−1t βτi(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
UCVAt
+Et
∫ τ¯
t
β−1t βsλ¯s
∑
i 6=0
J isIM
i
sds︸ ︷︷ ︸
MVAt
+ Et
∫ τ¯
t
β−1t βsλs
(∑
i 6=0
J isP
i
s − TRC?s
)+
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
FVA?t
, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ¯ .
(34)
Recall that H2 denotes the space of ·2-integrable processes over [0, τ¯ ].
Theorem 10.1 Assuming that r and λ are bounded from below and that r and
λ(
∑
i 6=0 J
iP i−UCVA−MVA) are in H2, then the counterparty risk replication BSDE
(34) has a unique solution TRC? in H2 .
Proof. Noting that the (UCVA+MVA) process is exogenous, the BSDE (34) is equiv-
alent to the following BSDE for the FVA? process:
βtFVA
?
t = Et
∫ τ¯
t
βsλs
(∑
i 6=0
J isP
i
s −UCVAs −MVAs − FVA?s
)+
ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ¯ , (35)
which is well-posed in H2 under the assumptions of the theorem, by the monotonic
generator BSDE arguments already used in the proof of Lemma 5.1.
If ηdM matches the martingale part of TRC? for some hedge η = η?, then we can
readily verify that the pair process (RC,TRC) = (TRC?,TRC?) yields a solution to
the risk-neutral XVA FBSDE (28) associated with η = η?. Since the resulting process
L vanishes, so do the corresponding EC and KVA processes and the ensuing FVA is
given by FVA?.
10.2 Main Loop
In practice, the depth of the counterparty risk hedging market is very far from the
replicating point where η = η? and L = 0 (not to say opposite to it, i.e. η = 0).
Consequently, unless λ = 0 (which may be realistic for some insurance cases but rarely
so for banks), the replication XVA TRC? should only be seen as the starting point for
the following iteration in the search for a solution to the FBSDE (28) (in the R̂C = TRC
case of a continuous-time realization of the losses): RC(0) = TRC(0) − y = TRC? − y
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and, for k ≥ 1,
RC
(k)
0 = TRC
(k−1)
0 − y and, for t ∈ (0, τ¯ ],
dRC
(k)
t = rtTRC
(k−1)
t dt−
∑
i 6=0
(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+δτi(dt)−UCVAτδτ (dt)
− λt
(∑
i 6=0
J itP
i
t − ECt
(
TRC(k−1) − RC(k−1))− TRC(k−1)t )+dt
− λ¯t
∑
i 6=0
J it IM
i
tdt+ ηtdMt;
TRC
(k)
t = Et
∑
t<τi≤τ¯
β−1t βτi(1−Ri)(Qiτi − IMiτi)+ + Et
[
β−1t βτ1{t<τ<T}UCVAτ
]
+ Et
∫ τ¯
t
β−1t βsλs
(∑
i 6=0
J isP
i
s − ECt
(
TRC(k−1) − RC(k))− TRC(k−1)s )+ds
+ Et
∫ τ¯
t
β−1t βsλ¯s
∑
i 6=0
J isIM
i
sds, t ∈ [0, τ¯ ].
(36)
However, going through this loop numerically necessitates a dynamic and iterative
simulation of economic capital processes EC(L) = max(ES(L),KVA(L)), including
conditional risk measure simulations and KVA BSDE solutions based on these. Some
approximations are required for the sake of tractability (especially on real life large
portfolios as of Sect. 11.2).
In practice, we suggest to pass only once in the loop (36), using TRC(1) as risk-
neutral XVA and L? = TRC?−RC(1) to compute ES(L?) and the ensuing KVA(L?) via
the KVA BSDE (13). A slightly simpler alternative is to use the linear KVA formula
(15) based on C = ES(L?), checking that the ensuing KVA is lower than ES(L?) (see
the remark 6.1). In addition, we use a deterministic term structure
ES?(t) ≈ ESt(L?) (37)
obtained by projecting in time instead of conditioning with respect to Gt.
From a theoretical perspective, controlling the iteration (36) for establishing its
convergence to (28) is challenging due to the terms of the form ECt(L), which involve
in a very nonlinear fashion the conditional law of the one-year-ahead increment of L.
The mathematical study of the well-posedness of the exact FBSDE (28) and of the
convergence toward it of the iterative scheme (36), of no direct use in this work, are
deferred to a separate BSDE paper.
11 Case Studies
As case studies, we present XVA computations on foreign-exchange and fixed-income
portfolios. Toward this end we use the market risk and portfolio credit risk models
of Albanese, Bellaj, Gimonet, and Pietronero (2011) calibrated to the relevant market
data. We assume no counterparty risk hedge (i.e. η = 0) and no margins on the
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portfolio, i.e. no variation or initial margins (but perfect variation-margining on the
portfolio back-to-back hedges). In particular, the MVA numbers are all equal to zero
and hence not reported in the tables below.
All the computations are run using a 4-socket server for Monte Carlo simulations,
NVIDIA GPUs for algebraic calculations and Global Valuation Esther as simulation
software. We use nested simulation with primary scenarios and secondary scenarios
generated under the risk neutral measure calibrated to derivative data using broker
datasets for derivative market data. For the purpose of the expected shortfall compu-
tations we use a historical measure on the secondary scenarios obtained by adjusting
the drifts of the risk-neutral model in such a way to satisfy backtesting benchmarks.
Based on the nested simulated paths, we first solve the counterparty risk replication
BSDE (34) for the process TRC?. We also obtain UCVA0 and a preliminary FVA value
as FVA?0 = TRC
?
0 −UCVA0.
The process RC(1) is then simulated based on the related forward SDE with η = 0
in (36) (note the EC term there vanishes in case k = 1).
The paths of L? = TRC? − RC(1) are used for inferring a term structure ES?(t) ≈
ESt(L
?) as of (37). This term structure is plugged as C in the linear formula (15) for
computing the KVA (see the last paragraph of Sect. 10.2), assuming a hurdle rate of
10.5%.
The backward SDE for TRC(1) in (36) is then used with the above approximation
ES? for the EC term in order to obtain a refined FVA value as FVA0 ≈ TRC(1)0 −
UCVA0.
11.1 Toy Portfolio
We first consider a portfolio of ten USD currency swaps depicted in Table 1, on the
date of 11 January 2016. The nominal of each swap is 104. The swaps are traded with
four counterparties, with 40% recovery rate and credit curves (also of the bank) as of
Table 2.
We use 20,000 primary scenarios up to 30 years in the future run on 54 underlying
time points with 1,000 secondary scenarios starting at each of these, which amounts
to a total of 20, 000 × 54 × 1, 000 = 1,080 million scenarios. The whole calculation
takes roughly 10 minutes to run (including the nested simulations for capital). The
corresponding XVA results are displayed in Table 3. Since the portfolio is not collater-
alized, its UCVA is quite high. But its KVA is even higher. The FVA is much smaller
as it is eroded by the collateral pockets provided by economic capital (and also, to
some lesser extent, by realized reserve capital). The reference “fair” FTDCVA and
FTDDVA metrics are also shown for comparison. Note that given our deterministic
term structure approximation (37) for expected shortfalls, the computation of the KVA
based on it reduces to a deterministic time-integral (which explains why there is no
related standard deviation error in Table 3).
Table 4 shows the incremental XVA results when Swap 5 (resp. 9) is last added
in the portfolio. Interestingly enough, all the incremental XVAs of Swap 9 (and also
the incremental FVA of Swap 5) are negative. Hence, Swap 9 is XVA profitable to
the portfolio, meaning that a price maker should be ready to enter the swap for less
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than its mark-to-market value, assuming it is already trading the rest of the portfolio.
This result illustrates the importance of the endowment in modern derivative portfolio
management.
Type ID Maturity Receiver Rate Payer Rate Netting Set
Swap 1 10y Par 6M LIBOR 3M C
Swap 2 10y LIBOR 3M Par 6M B
Swap 3 5y Par 6M LIBOR 3M B
Swap 4 5y LIBOR 3M Par 6M C
Swap 5 30y Par 6M LIBOR 3M B
Swap 6 30y LIBOR 3M Par 6M A
Swap 7 2y Par 6M LIBOR 3M A
Swap 8 2y LIBOR 3M Par 6M D
Swap 9 15y Par 6M LIBOR 3M A
Swap 10 15y LIBOR 3M Par 6M D
Table 1: Portfolio of USD currency swaps.
6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 30Y 50Y
A 9 11 18 25 33 41 55 65 68 70 71 70
B 12 15 25 37 49 62 79 91 95 97 98 98
C 44 59 102 146 191 235 276 295 301 302 304 304
D 272 291 327 367 400 433 452 460 460 462 461 461
Bank 18 24 40 58 77 96 120 134 139 141 142 142
Table 2: Credit curves of the counterparties and the bank.
$Value Standard Rel. Error
FTDCVA0 372.22 0.46%
FTDDVA0 335.94 0.51%
UCVA0 471.23 0.46%
FVA0 73.87 1.06%
KVA0 668.83 N/A
Table 3: XVA values for the toy portfolio.
11.2 Large Portfolio
We now consider a representative fixed-income portfolio with about 2,000 counter-
parties, 100,000 fixed income trades including swaps, swaptions, FX options, inflation
swaps and CDS trades.
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Incremental $Value for Swap 5
FTDCVA0 98.49
FTDDVA0 122.91
UCVA0 155.46
FVA0 -85.28
KVA0 127.54
Incremental $Value for Swap 9
FTDCVA0 -23.83
FTDDVA0 -73.63
UCVA0 -27.17
FVA0 -8.81
KVA0 -52.85
Table 4: Incremental XVAs when a swap is added last into the portfolio. Left: Impact
of Swap 5. Right: Impact of Swap 9.
XVA $Value
UCVA0 242 M
FVA?0 126 M
FVA0 62 M
KVA0 275 M
Table 5: XVA values for the large portfolio.
We use 20,000 primary scenarios up to 50 years in the future run on 100 underlying
time points with 1,000 secondary scenarios starting at each of these, which amounts to
a total of two billion scenarios. In this case the whole calculation takes 3 hours. Table
5 shows the XVA results for the case study portfolio.
The KVA amounts to $275 M, which makes it the greatest of the XVA numbers,
roughly fifteen percent above the (even though uncollateralized) UCVA. The left panel
in Figure 3 shows the term structure of economic capital along with the term structure
of the KVA obtained by the deterministic term structure approximation ES? as of (37)
for economic capital and the linear formula (15) for the KVA. Note that the KVA
obtained in this way is at all times below the corresponding expected shortfall (cf. the
remark 6.1).
We report two FVA metrics to show how the FVA gets reduced when we consider
additional funding sources. The number FVA? accounting only for re-hypothecation of
variation margin received on hedges amounts to approximately $126 M. However, if we
consider the additional funding sources due to economic capital and realized reserve
capital, we arrive at an FVA figure of $62 M, less than a half of the re-hypothecation-
only FVA. The funding needs’ reduction achieved by EC, UCVA and FVA is also
shown in the right panel of Figure 3 by the FVA blended curve. This is the FVA
funding curve which, whenever applied to the FVA computed neglecting the impact
of economic and reserve capital, gives rise to the same term structure for the forward
FVA as the calculation carried out including instead capital in the calculation as a
source for funding. This blended curve is often inferred by consensus estimates based
on the Markit XVA service. However, here it is computed from the ground up based
on full-fledged capital projections.
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Figure 3: (Left) Term structure of economic capital computed as the expected shortfall
with 97.5% confidence for capital return distribution compared with the term structure
of KVA. (Right) FVA blended curve computed from the ground up based on capital
projections.
A Further Discussions
A.1 KVA Is Not a CET1 Deduction
In Green, Kenyon, and Dennis (2014) as also discussed in some theoretical actuarial
literature (see Salzmann and Wu¨thrich (2010, Sect. 4.4)), the KVA is treated as yet
another risk neutral XVA which enters with an additional (dKVAt−rtKVAtdt) term in
RC equations such as (26). The term (dKVAt − rtKVAtdt) is treated as an additional
cash-flow released by the XVA trader to the shareholders, as if, in particular, there
was a single account for reserve capital and retained earnings altogether.
From the balance-sheet point of view of Sect. 3 (cf. Figure 1), this is tantamount
to treating the KVA as a CET1 deduction, i.e. considering the theoretical target value
KVA of retained earnings (e.g. the solution to our KVA BSDE (13)) as a further
contra-asset in (5). This results in an equity defined from the following balance sheet
equation (compare with (5)):
Assets− (UCVA + FVA + MVA + KVA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contra-assets
= Liabilities + Equity.
One then obtains an ersatz of the FTP rule (8) by postulating a flat Equity at a new
deal, which leads to
FTP = ∆(Assets− Liabilities) = ∆UCVA + ∆FVA + ∆MVA + ∆KVA. (38)
This is formally the same FTP formula as (8), but the KVA and the FVA components
in the two formulas differ. Namely, in (8), the TRC = UCVA+FVA+MVA is computed
in a first step by postulating a flat CET1 net of the KVA account (cf. Figure 1 and (6)).
The KVA is then obtained by using the ensuing loss process L = TRC− RC as input
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data in the KVA BSDE (13). By contrast, with (38), the sum between TRC and KVA
is computed in one shot by postulating a flat Equity, subject to the constraint that the
KVA satisfies the KVA BSDE (13) with input data L = TRC − RC. This is not only
erroneous conceptually, but untractable numerically unless simplifying approximations
are made to decouple the flat Equity equation from the constraint, such as working with
regulatory instead of economic capital (otherwise KVA fluctations should be simulated
for capital calculations) and ignoring that the KVA is loss-absorbing and in Green
et al. (2014).
A.2 About the Solvency Accounting Condition
As discussed after (18), our Solvency-like accounting condition C ≥ K(C) is meant to
express a switching (or transferability) property of the bank to new shareholders at any
time if need be. Accounting for a losses realization schedule (tl) and the ensuing reserve
capital shortfall L̂ = TRC − R̂C (see Lemma 7.1 and the surrounding comments), a
relevant refinement of this condition should be C ≥ K(C) + L̂. However, under this
refined constraint and for the correspondingly amended form of the set of admissible
economic capital processes C (cf. (18)), the mathematical solution of the capital at risk
optimization problem in Part II becomes less clear. But, in the end, we work under
the modeling assumption of a continuous-time realization of the losses, in which case L̂
vanishes identically. In this case the difference between the basic accounting condition
C ≥ K(C) and the refined accounting condition C ≥ K(C) + L̂ is immaterial.
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Main Acronyms
CDS Credit default swap.
CET1 Common Equity Tier I Capital.
CVA Credit valuation adjustment (can be either UCVA or FTDCVA).
DVA Debt valuation adjustment (can be either UDVA or FTDDVA).
DVA2 Funding debt adjustment (same as FDA).
EC Economic capital.
ES Expected shortfall.
FDA Funding liability adjustment (same as DVA2).
FRTB Fundamental Review of the Trading Book.
FTDCVA First-to-default CVA.
FTDDVA First-to-default DVA.
FTP Funds transfer pricing.
FVA Funding valuation adjustment.
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards.
IM Initial margin.
KVA Capital valuation adjustment (the banking notion of risk margins)
MtM Mark-to-market.
MVA Margin valuation adjustment.
OIS rate Overnight index swap rate.
RACET1 Risk-adjusted CET1.
RC Reserve capital.
SCR Shareholders’ capital at risk.
TRC Target reserve capital (same as risk-neutral XVA).
UCVA Unilateral CVA.
UDVA Unilateral DVA.
VM Variation margin.
XVA Generic “X” valuation adjustment
